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Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān / Wish and Desire
The act of hoping for or wanting something and the object of that act. There are three main agencies through which wish and desire are exercised in the Qurʾān: one is divine, another human, and the third satanic (see devil ). The manifestations and the interplay of the three create an ethical tension (see ethics and the qurʾān ) that evokes questions of accountability, responsibility (q.v.) and justice (see justice and injustice ). In that sense, wish and desire become the principles whereby the subject and the object are placed into a value-laden relationship. Be it an act of God, Satan, or the human being, wish and desire are a function of the subject's awareness and expectations of the object. Among the three, God's wishes are mentioned most frequently. ¶ The phrase “God willing” (in shāʾa llāh) is both common and varied, indicating that God's wishes are exercised at both cosmic and everyday levels (see cosmology ). Like many other passages, q 5:17 affirms that it was through God's wish/will that the world came into being (yakhluqu mā yashāʾu) in such a way that associates his wishing with his infinite power ( wa-Allāh ʿalā kulli shayʾin qadīrun; see power and impotence; freedom and predestination). As divine wish is inextricably linked with divine omnipotence, it is continuously carried out within and beyond worldly limits (see world ). No wonder then that the verb shāʾa and its derivatives appear over 500 times in the Qurʾān, mainly in reference to God.
Although at first glance God's wishes appear volatile and unpredictable, the Qurʾān ascertains that their function and purpose can be appreciated only after the human mind accepts its own limitations (see intellect; knowledge and learning). In q 18:23-4, the Qurʾān warns: “And do not say anything like ‘I will surely do this tomorrow.’ Unless God wishes, and remember your lord (q.v.) when you forget (see remembrance; memory) and say, ‘Maybe my lord will guide me (see astray ) to a nearer way to truth (q.v.) than this.’” Historically understood as a response to Muḥammad's negligence when he answered a Qurayshī inquirer (see quraysh ) with inappropriate self-confidence — “Come tomorrow and I will surely give you an answer” but without adding the phrase in shāʾa llāh — this verse was ostensibly intended to highlight the unpredictability of divine volition even in the context of Muḥammad's own prophetic mission (see prophets and prophethood). ¶ Reflecting upon this essential dependability on, yet inaccessibility to, divine wishes, classical Muslim exegetes (see exegesis of the qurʾān: classical and medieval ) interpret the ubiquitous in shāʾa llāh phrase in relation to their theological positions on free will and predetermination. Al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), for example, develops a lengthy argument by contrasting the Muʿtazilī (see muʿtazila ) and his own Ashʿarī positions and concludes that: one, we can never be sure that we will/can do anything until God gives us permission; and, two, we should never anticipate future events because, if they prove to be different, we will be deemed liars (see lie; foretelling; theology and the qurʾān). He charges the Muʿtazila with transferring the agency of wishes and desire to human beings rather than leaving it with its divine source. When God asks for belief (see belief and unbelief ) and obedience (q.v.) and his servants disobey (see disobedience ), al-Rāzī continues, God's wishes are not fulfilled. In contrast, he holds that everything that God wills must happen: for example, if a man says, “Tomorrow I will return the debt I owe, if God wills,” and if he fails to do it, he cannot be blamed because this was clearly God's wish and we can either understand it or not. He contrasts this interpretation with that of the Muʿtazila, according to which it is the man who is to blame if the debt is not returned because man's evil nature (see good and evil; fall of man) prevents him from doing what he has promised (Rāzī, Tafsīr). Al-Rāzī's interpretation poignantly relates to q 81:27-9 which says, “This is surely a reminder to all human beings (lil-ʿālamīna), and those among them who wish to change their ways (an yastaqīma); you cannot wish but what God, the lord of all worlds, wishes” (the wording almost identical to q 76:29-30).
In addition to shāʾa, God's wishes are also expressed through the verb arāda. ¶ Although often used synonymously with shāʾa, arāda evokes more strongly divine intentionality, as in q 2:26: “What does God intend/mean (mādhā arāda) by this parable (q.v.)?” Reflecting thus with divine deliberation, arāda attempts to lay out the inner workings of the divine order in the implementation of God's desires, as per q 16:40: “Truly, when we refer to a thing, if we want it to be (idhā aradnāhu), we just tell it ‘Be!’ and it is.” God does not desire without a purpose but the speculations of what that purpose might be yields different theological possibilities.
While continuously attesting to the power of divine desire, both shāʾa and arāda place human beings in a direct and dynamic relationship with it. But the nature of that relationship is far from simple. In fact, its complexity has created a theological conundrum and the rise of several scholastic positions on the questions of free will and predestination. Can human beings act on their own wishes and desires? Do these desires predate them in accordance with the divine plan? Notwithstanding the theological and political implications of such questions in Islamic history, it is clear that the Qurʾān keeps the tension among different possibilities alive, placing divine and human wishes simultaneously in harmony and conflict, and perpetuating sharp ethical differentiations between the wishes and desires of believers and those of nonbelievers. There are no simple answers in the Qurʾān or in the later intellectual tradition, even though the message seems rather straightforward, as q 6:125 states (similarly, in q 5:41; 6:17, 125; 7:176; 10:107; etc.): “Whomever God wishes to guide, he opens his heart (q.v.) to Islam; whomever God wishes to lead astray, he restricts his heart, as if he is rising to heaven (see heaven and sky ). This is how God inflicts punishment (see chastisement and punishment ) on those who do not believe.”¶
In this sense, because the relational function of divine desire necessitates reciprocity, many qurʾānic passages posit human beings not only as objects of God's wishes and intentions but as subjects/agents exercising their own desires. It is here that the Qurʾān draws a sharp distinction between believers and nonbelievers. Believers surrender to God's wishes and, in turn, become conscious of, and act on, their desires for divine grace (q.v.) and mercy (q.v.). Nonbelievers, on the other hand, reject God and direct their desires elsewhere, for which they become eternally condemned, as in q 18:29, “Say, The truth comes from your lord; whoever so wishes, let them believe; whoever wishes, let them disbelieve,” upon which the Qurʾān details the difference in the outcome of the two choices for the condition in the hereafter ( q 18:30-44; see eschatology; reward and punishment). Human desire directly reflects both one's knowledge of God and one's system of belief (see faith; religion). Those who lived in the pre-Islamic Age of Ignorance (q.v.; jāhiliyya) are accused not only of their ignorance (q.v.) of the creator (see creation ) but of the stubborn, blinding urge to fulfill their desire for material and visible goods (see wealth; insolence and obstinacy): “There is only our life in the present world; we die (see death and the dead ), we live (see life ), and only fate (q.v.)/time (q.v.; al- dahr) destroys us” ( q 45:24). The pursuit of this-worldly desires is a pursuit for self-realization that reflects the pre-Islamic teaching that all sensations and experiences belong to the physical world only, in contrast to the qurʾānic cosmos in which the greatest self-fulfillment comes in the hereafter, as worded in q 87:16-17: “No, you prefer the life of this world; whereas the hereafter is superior and lasting” (see transience; eternity). ¶ Human desires are thus bifurcated into those that are low and worldly, characteristic of a conduct inspired by one's whims and fancies ( ahwāʾ [sing. hawā], appearing numerous times, e.g. q 3:14; 18:28; 20:16; 25:43; 28:50; 42:15; 45:18), and those that are ethically sound and inspire to behave and do one's duty as a servant (q.v.) of God. An example of this distinction is those incidents at the early stages of Muḥammad's career when pagan Arabs hurled accusations at him and the Qurʾān responded ( q 53:2-3): “No, your companion has not strayed away nor has he erred, and he does not speak on a whim (mā yanṭiqu ʿani l-hawā; see opposition to muḥammad; pre-islamic arabia and the qurʾān).”
In addition to the ethics of desire-driven behavior, the issue of human wishes and yearning acquires another interpretative trajectory, associated with the Ṣūfī worldview (see ṣūfism and the qurʾān ). For the Ṣūfīs, a ḥadīth qudsī (see ḥadīth and the qurʾān ) exemplifies the principle of the relationship between God and human beings: “I was a hidden treasure and I longed to be known, so I created the world.” The desire for self-reflection is believed to inspire the very act of creation. Focusing on the language of love (q.v.) and yearning that permeates much of the Qurʾān (e.g. q 2:165, 195; 49:9; 57:19, 23; 60:1, 8; etc.), the mystics define desire as a spiritual propeller that allows the wayfarer (see journey ) to achieve closeness with God. The wayfarer is often referred to as the murīd — the active participle form of arāda — in accordance with the aforementioned double-entendre of arāda, to want and to intend. The desire for God is personalized as both affection and primordial yearning for beatific vision (see face of god ), in accordance with not only the ḥadīth qudsī mentioned above, but also with the qurʾānic phrase ibtighāʾa wajhi llāh, “out of yearning for God's face,” that appears in q 2:272, 6:52 and 92:20. ¶ After all, it is only God's face that lasts forever while everything else perishes ( q 28:88). Desiring it (both arāda and ibtaghā are used in the Qurʾān) is therefore the only ultimate kind of desire and yearning a believer can have in this self-reflective genesis of creation.
Finally, in the ethical triangle of wishing/desiring, Satan's role in splitting humankind into believers and nonbelievers is instrumental: wa-yurīdu l- shayṭānu an yuḍillahum ḍalālan baʿīdan ( q 4:60; see parties and factions; enemies). The Qurʾān repeatedly mentions Satan's desire to confuse and lead humankind astray as a vindictive reaction against his expulsion from heaven. Satan's rebelliousness (see rebellion; arrogance) is thus expressed through his desires to intervene at the level of human action. Because metaphysically speaking Satan is neither superior nor equal to God, his desires do not pose a competition to God's nor do they overrun them. Rather, being more powerful than inferior human beings, Satan desires to confuse them about the nature of divine commands, leading them away from God's path (e.g. q 4:48, 60; 22:52; see path or way ), making them forget God ( q 5:91), tempting them with various promises which he never fulfills ( q 4:120; 7:20; 8:48; 14:22, etc.) and ever deceiving them ( q 4:76; 24:21; 58:10; see joy and misery ). Satan thus redirects human desire from God to himself, turning himself into the false object of desire: “God made a true promise to you (see covenant ). I too made promises, but did not keep them. I had no authority over you, but when I called out to you, you answered. Do not blame me; blame yourselves.” ¶ Those who, against God's warnings (e.g. q 7:27, “Children of Adam, do not let Satan seduce you”; see adam and eve; oaths; breaking trusts and contracts ), respond to Satan, are doomed, as in q 43:36: “And whoever turns away from remembrance of the compassionate (see god and his attributes ), we shall assign Satan to be his companion.”
Divine wishes thus tower over both human and Satanic ones, keeping the two in a tension that creates a range of possibilities that people can choose once they are offered the knowledge of God's path. This interplay functionally separates the three agents only in the realm of individual action, laying out specific guidelines for practical judgments as well as inducing divergent theological debates on the issues of accountability, justice and responsibility. In the cosmic scheme of things, however, divine wishes prevail and reflect the integrity and omnipotence of God's plan to make all human beings aware of the ways to realize their ultimate desires. Regarding the theological matters of agency, Muslim orthodoxy eventually found a middle ground that, no matter what the subjective reasons for acting on one's desires through the principles of acquisition ( kasb) may be, the epistemic frame of reference is unwavering, stable, and clear. The Ashʿarīs sum up this position in the following terms:
His will is one, everlasting, connected to all willing from his own actions, and the actions of his servants insofar as they are created for him, not insofar as they are acquired from them. From that, he said that he willed everything, good and bad, beneficial and harmful, just as he willed and knew it to be. He willed from his servants what he knew and what he commanded his pen (see writing and writing materials ) to write on the preserved tablet (q.v.). That is his decree, ruling, and predetermination which never changed and can never be replaced. ¶ It is impossible for anything to be against what is known and predetermined in form in this manner (from Shahrastānī, Milal, i, 66-9; trans. M. Sells, Early Islamic mysticism, 320).
- Bibliography
- Primary
Rāzī, Tafsīr, Beirut 1981
Shahrastānī, Milal
- Secondary
M. Fakhry (trans.), An interpretation of the Qurʾān, New York 2004
F. Denny, The will in the Qurʾān, in jnes 40/3 (1981), 253-7
I. Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic theology and law, Princeton 1981
H. Kassis, A concordance of the Qurʾān, Berkeley 1983
M. Sells (trans. and ed.), Early Islamic mysticism, New York 1996
M. Watt, Free will and predestination in early Islam, London 1948
T.J. Winter, Desire and decency in the Islamic tradition, in Islamica (London pub.) 1/4 (1994), 9-12
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