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Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān

Ethics and the Qurʾān (15,872 words)

Article Table of Contents: Ethical knowledge; Terminology; Ethical knowledge and moral reasoning; Nature of the Qurʾān’s ethical stipulations; Ethical sociology; Conclusion; Bibliography

The subject matter of this article is elusive, since the word «ethics» itself is used in various ways in English. If we take the definition of a standard reference work, we learn that «ethics» is «(1) a general pattern or way of life, (2) a set of rules of conduct or moral code, and (3) inquiry about life and ¶ rules of conduct…» (Encyclopedia of philosophy, iii, 81-2). This article’s focus, then, will be qurʾānic ethics in senses (1) and (2) above; we might also use the word "morality, " i.e. "beliefs about human nature, beliefs about ideals — what is good for its own sake, rules stipulating action, and motives (ibid., vii, 150). Both terms, ethics and morals, suggest the scope of our inquiry. The Qurʾān abounds with "rules of conduct, " and, taken in its entirety, establishes much of a «way of life.» While it has little by way of "inquiry about rules of conduct, " that is, what philosophers call philosophical or meta-ethics, nonetheless it is possible to infer from the qurʾānic text certain meta-ethical presuppositions and methods.

It must be recognized from the start that the Qurʾān contains more exhortation than stipulation. Despite the plethora of rules that confronts the Qurʾān’s reader in the first sūras (which, chronologically speaking, are actually from the latter part of the period of revelation), most of the Qurʾān rallies Muslims to act rightly, and reframes their moral knowledge in a context of retribution and reward in this world (see blessing; chastisement and punishment), and judgment and subsequent punishment and reward in the next (see last judgment; reward and punishment).

Two general points about qurʾānic morality follow from recognizing the nature of the qurʾānic discourse. The Qurʾān assumes that (a) humans know the good and nonetheless often fail to follow it; (b) that since humans know the good, they know too that explanations of why the good is the good are beside the point; the good has the utility of guaranteeing success and reward, but nothing suggests that the good is good for some reason extrinsic to itself. These two moral facts are framed by two other important features of qurʾānic ethics: (a) that the Qurʾān takes for granted the ¶ vices, virtues and modes of human organization present at the time of revelation, and (b) that it has a jaundiced view of human capacity and goodwill (see community and society in the qurʾān; pre-islamic arabia and the qurʾān).

Yet the Qurʾān’s embeddedness in seventh-century Arabian society and those particular notions of virtue and vice should not cause us to lose sight of novel features of its ethical perspective: 1) an assertion of the ultimate meaningfulness of human acts and a variety of compelling theories of why humans should act virtuously; 2) an emphasis on individual but also collective responsibility for the ethical treatment of all persons, whether male or female, infant, wayfarer, neighbor, parent, or wife (see children; family; women and the qurʾān; kinship). The Qurʾān should be seen as revolutionary not in its content, but rather in its justification. It did not so much provide new rules, as a new perspective — namely, that the claims of morality transcend mere human interest and are the very purpose of human existence.

While the distinction between «religion» and «ethics» so dear to philosophical ethicists is unnatural to the Qurʾān, nonetheless the focus here will be on passages discussing virtuous conduct toward human beings rather than those concerned with virtuous attitudes towards God, right beliefs about God, etc. (for discussion of this aspect of right conduct, see faith; belief and unbelief). In addition, this essay will concentrate on passages important within the Qurʾān itself and not necessarily on those esteemed in later legal, theological, or mystical scholarship (see law and the qurʾān; theology and the qurʾān; ṣūfism and the qurʾān). Questions of the sequence of qurʾānic revelation — so important for choosing among apparently contradictory qurʾānic passages — will, for ¶ the most part, lie outside the scope of this article (on this, see abrogation; chronology and the qurʾān).

Accordingly, these issues will be considered in what follows:

(1) ethical knowledge (human capacity and human nature; motivations to moral action; the reality of moral choice),

(2) terminology (classifying acts; classifying actors),

(3) ethical knowledge and moral reasoning,

(4) the nature of the Qurʾān’s ethical stipulations (rules; principles; admonitions to virtue),

(5) ethical sociology (Muslims and non-Muslims; Muslims).

Ethical knowledge
Human capacity

Three grand ethical questions reveal the assumptions underlying the qurʾānic view of ethics: What is the innate moral nature of human beings? What motivates them to moral action? Are moral choices «real?»

Human nature

The description of human nature in the Qurʾān is not sanguine. It repeatedly complains that human beings are fickle: If harm touches a human he calls to his lord, inclining towards him; then if granted a favor from God he forgets that for which he pleaded before (cf. q 39:49). They are attentive to God and upright in conduct when in jeopardy or when suffering, but heedless when secure (q 17:83; 41:51; 70:19-21). They seek evil as much as good (q 17:11), they are prone to oppression and ingratitude (cf. q 13:34; 22:26; see gratitude and ingratitude), they are hasty (q 17:11; 21:37), weak (q 4:28), and they are oppressive and ignorant (q 33:72; see ignorance).

This bleak picture is modified in two ways. The same human nature that is inclined to err, can also, as we shall see below, recognize the good by reflection, reason, or instinct. In addition, innate hu-¶ man responses to evil and good show that human nature is not hopelessly corrupt, e.g. q 49:7: «…God has made you love faith and has made it beautiful to your hearts and made hateful to you ingratitude(kufr), wickedness (fusūq) and rebellion. These are the rightly guided!» Nothing in the Qurʾān’s jaundiced view of human propensities suggests that humans cannot act ethically, and consequently there is no need for supernatural grace or a redemptive sacrifice (but see below on predestination). Indeed, the entire qurʾānic kerygma makes no sense if ethical and virtuous action is not possible. In its description of human nature, the Qurʾān maintains an artful tension between the possibility of human perfection and the reality of human moral deficiency.

Motivations to moral action

If human nature is pulled between inclinations to evil conduct and recognition of the good, what, then, motivates humankind to act virtuously? Here the Qurʾān offers some of its most distinctive and original arguments, which are incomprehensible without some knowledge of the Arab milieu in which the Qurʾān arose. There are three overlapping motives to human virtue — two are claims that God has on humankind, and the third, more common one, is what might be seen as a prudential motive.

The first motivation to moral action is the myth of the primordial covenant (q.v.). This is an overtly mythological story of a primordial commitment to obey God. It is, as al-Nīsābūrī (Tafsīr, ix, 85) says: «The establishment of compelling evidence against (ḥujja ʿalā) all who are responsible (jamīʿat al-mukallafīn) [to God, but would attempt to deny that obligation].» Its source is q 7:172: «When your lord took from the children of Adam, from their loins (ẓuhūrihim) their seed and called them ¶ to testify of themselves: ‘Am I not your lord?’ They said, ‘Indeed yes!’ We testify; lest you should say on the day of resurrection, ‘We were unaware of this!’» In this myth, all human beings in potentia acknowledged their obligation to obey God’s dictates because of his status as their sovereign. The last sentence makes it clear that what is at issue here is whether humans are innately morally responsible. The answer is yes, they have committed themselves primordially to obedience (q.v.; al- mīthāq al-awwal ʿalā l-fiṭra, as al-Ṭabarī in Tafsīr, ix, 112 calls it), and so to morality.

The argument most central to the Qurʾān’s view of human moral obligation is that of «thanking the benefactor.» This understanding of human ethical motivation begins with God’s status as the creator of humankind and the world (q 19:67; 30:8; 50:16; 89:15; see creation). A clear statement of the argument is found in q 39:5-7: «He created the heavens and the earth with truth (bi-l- ḥaqqi), and made night follow day and made day follow night; he subjected the sun (q.v.) and the moon (q.v.) to service, each running for a stipulated term. Is he not the mighty and forgiving? He created you from a single soul then made of it its mate and sent down to you eight couples of cattle. He created you in your mothers' bellies, creation after creation, in the three darknesses. This is your God, your lord; his is sovereignty, there is no god but he. How then did you depart? If you are ungrateful (takfurū), God is quit of you, nor is he content with ingratitude from his bondsmen. If you are thankful (tashkurū), it contents him with you….»

According to pre-Islamic norms, one who spared a life, that is, in effect, gave life, was owed something by the one who benefited from this generosity (see bloodshed). The benefactor was entitled both to reward and to public acknowledgement of the benefactor’s generosity in sparing life. In the ¶ qurʾānic understanding, by giving life, by not taking life, as well as because of a whole series of other benefactions — rain, food, sustenance — God establishes a claim (ḥaqq) on humankind (see Bravmann, Ancient Arab background; Reinhart, Before revelation, chap. 6). This is clear in q 14:32-4: «It is God who created the heavens and the earth and sent down from the sky water, then produced by it fruits as sustenance for you; and he made ships serviceable to you to run upon the sea for you by his command; and made rivers serviceable to you. And he makes serviceable to you the sun and the moon in their courses and made serviceable to you the night and the day. And he gives you of all you ask him; if you counted the benefactions of God you could not reckon them. Truly humankind are wrong-doers, ingrates!»

Consequently, like the warrior who spared a life, God is entitled to a proclamation (shukr) of his generosity and a gesture that would content (raḍā) him. The passage quoted at the beginning of this section says that it is the proclamation of his sovereignty that contents him, and further, that by being an obedient bondsman one expresses the gratitude that is owed: «Be a bondsman (fa-ʿbud) and be one of the thankers» (q 39:66).

In the qurʾānic moral calculus, the obligation of humans to act morally arises from their obligation to acknowledge and repay their debt to the creator and benefactor. Since what God asks is obedience to his command — to perform the cultus (see prayer; islām; worship), to struggle (see jihād), to act rightly — human beings are then obliged, though not compelled, to act in accord with his desires.

The third and most prominent claim to obedience and the religious and moral behavior the Qurʾān enjoins is fear (q.v.), or to put it more conventionally, a prudential concern for one’s eternal fate. Perhaps the¶ central theme of the qurʾānic revelation is the reality of the judgment that forms an inevitable part of the cosmic order: «…God has created the heavens and the earth and that which is between them only by right (bi-l- ḥaqqi) and for a stated term…. Have they not journeyed in the land and seen the consequence of those who were before them?… Their messengers (see messenger) came to them with signs (bi-l- bayyināti); for God did not wrong (ẓ-l-m) them, but they wronged themselves. Then the consequence for those who did evil was evil, for they denied (k-dh-b) the signs (āyāt) of God and mocked them. God originates creation then brings it back, then to him you return…. As for those who had faith and did good deeds (ṣāliḥāt), they shall rejoice in a garden; as for those who rejected or denied our signs and the encounter with the next life, they will be in punishment» (q 30:8-11, 15-6).

These themes are present on almost every qurʾānic page. Thus, while relations between humankind and God may be governed by a primordial covenant and by the claim of God on those whom he has benefacted in the here-and-now, also and overwhelmingly, the force of sanction for ill-deeds and reward for good deeds confronts the moral actor. Accordingly, in the long run humankind is given a clearly prudential motive to act virtuously. Virtue produces bliss (eventually) and vice leads to eternal chastisement.

These three factors — keeping a promise made primordially, paying back what is owed by acting well, and fear of punishment — all motivate the Qurʾān’s audience to act ethically.

The reality of moral choice

One problem with the qurʾānic text — one that has received perhaps too much attention from Muslim theologians and Western polemicists — is the question of «predesti-¶ nation» in the Qurʾān. It is important to note that terms for «predestination» used in later disputes (qadar, taqdīr, qaḍāʾ) do not, in the Qurʾān, necessarily suggest predetermination of human moral choice. Rather, there are a number of texts suggesting that rejection of the qurʾānic message or the Prophet (and similarly plotting against the Prophet, hypocrisy in commitment to him and to God, and the like; on the hypocrites, see, for example, q 4:88; see opposition to muḥammad; hypocrites and hypocrisy), are the results of God’s «turning away» the hearts of the recalcitrant. Examples include q 5:49: "Then if they turn away, know that God wishes to strike them for some of their sins, " and q 4:88: «Do you wish to guide whom God has led astray(aḍalla)? Whom God leads astray, you [Muḥammad] can find no road for him» (see also q 30:29). Similarly, «…God leads astray whom he wishes and guides to himself those who turn to him [in repentance]» (q 13:27; see also q 6:35, 125; 7:178; 10:100; 11:34; 81:28-9); «The one whom God leads astray(yuḍlil) has no protecting friend (walī) after him» (q 42:44); and «…So when they turned aside (zāghū), God caused their hearts to go astray(a zāgha llāhu qulūbahum). And God does not guide a corrupt people (al- qawma l-fāsiqīna)» (q 61:5). These texts have been read, understandably, as suggesting that God causes the errant to err. If this is the case, moral choice is illusory and punishment for moral transgressions seems unjust.

On the other hand, the entire argument of the Qurʾān, that humans will be judged for their actions and that they ought to behave in such and such a manner, makes no sense if humans are not understood to be faced with real moral choices and with justified (in humanly comprehensible terms) consequences. Those who were concerned to assert the reality of human moral judg-¶ ment also had a large number of texts to point to; for example, «…Who wishes, let him have faith; and who wishes, let him reject» (q 18:29); or «God does not charge a soul beyond what it can encompass. He has for it only what it has earned and against it what it has earned» (q 2:286). Similarly, the following passage assumes the efficacy of moral behavior and the consequentiality of those acts: «…Do not those who believe know that, had God wished, he would have guided the people altogether; and catastrophe does not cease to afflict those who reject according to what they do» (q 13:31). In these texts, as well as in many other passages, the Qurʾān clearly states that human beings earn their fate and they are free to choose virtue or vice.

In sum, on the vexed question of predestination, predetermination and the like, the Qurʾān asserts the controlling authority of God, while also assuming the reality of human agency. For later systematizers, this contradiction had to be resolved in one direction or the other; but the religious sensibility of the Qurʾān can hold the two in tension and assert both limits to human capacity and the fact of human ethical responsibility (for further discussion on this, see astray; freedom and predestination; fate; destiny).

Terminology

The best index of ethics in the Qurʾān is the terms used in it to discuss moral and immoral behavior.

Classifying acts

The Arabic term most frequently translated as ethics, akhlāq, is not found in the Qurʾān and there are few words that suggest a technical terminology for «ethics» — i.e. terms like the English words «virtue (q.v.)» or «conduct.» Rather, the terms used to describe virtue and vice are for the most part plain words like ¶ «good» and "bad, " «right» and «wrong.» A general feature of qurʾānic ethical terminology is that it typically commends the good far more than it stipulates what the good is; the Qurʾān assumes that much of the good and its opposite is known or recognizable (maʿrūf). It is notable that the Qurʾān exhorts the Muslim to act virtuously but seldom specifies the exact form of that virtuous conduct. At most, the Qurʾān provides lists of good or bad acts that suggest the scope of morality, but do not define it (see also good deeds; evil deeds; good and evil; sin and crime; sin, major and minor).

Virtuous acts

The most prominent word for virtuous conduct is ṣāliḥ or other words from the root which occur some 171 times in the Qurʾān. The root appears in verbal forms as in, «Who does right (man ṣalaḥa) from among their fathers, wives, and offspring [shall enter the garden of Eden]» (q 40:8; also 13:23). Its most common form is a nominal in stereotype with ʿamila as "do good deeds, " or «those who do virtuous acts» (alladhīna ʿamilū l-ṣāliḥāt, e.g. q 2:25 and numerous other instances). ʿAmila l-ṣāliḥāt is so common as to amount almost to a chorus in qurʾānic discourse. Very often ṣāliḥ is joined to other fundamental qurʾānic concepts, as in q 5:93: «For those who have faith and do good deeds there shall be no transgression (junāḥ) concerning what they have eaten. Therefore — [be one of those who] fear God and have faith and do good deeds; then, fear God and have faith; then, fear God and do kindness (aḥsanū); God loves those who do kindness.» (On junāḥ and aḥsanū see below.) Ṣāliḥ-acts explicitly earn the doer paradise (q.v.; q 2:25; 5:93; 18:107) and this twinning of faith and good deeds led Izutsu (Concepts, 204) to speculate that ṣāliḥ is the outward expression of the faith enjoined by ¶ the Qurʾān. It certainly is the case that ṣāliḥ is sometimes found among the qualities listed in passages that read like catechisms of what it means to be a virtuous Muslim (see, for instance, q 2:277; 5:69). Yet, for all its prominence, the ṣāliḥ is undefined and this it shares with the other important terms for virtue. The hearer of the Qurʾān knew or recognized a good deed and he or she will be rewarded for doing that good deed. The specifics in context, however, are left to the Muslims' faculties to recognize.

Another important qurʾānic term for virtue is birr and various derivatives of the root letters b-r-r (see Izutsu, Concepts, 207-11). Birr seems to be a general word connoting virtue or righteousness in the context of religious attitudes and acts, and can occur also in verbal form, as in q 2:224: "…act well (tabarrū), fear God, and reconcile people, " or q 60:8: «…to be good to [your opponents] and be equitable toward them.» From the same root comes barr, which seems to mean, literally, "pious, " that is, filial toward parents (see q 19:14, 32). The most common form, however, is the nominative, al-birr, which is used eight times in the Qurʾān (q 2:44, 177 [twice], 189 [twice]; 3:92; 5:2; 58:9), mostly in passages coming from the later period of revelation. In three instances (q 3:92; 5:2; 58:9) it is paired with taqwā, «piety» or "an awareness of God, " or another derivative of the root letters w-q-y; in all cases it is overtly virtue in a religious context that is implied. There is some evidence that birr is a pre-Islamic religious term, since q 2:189 addresses what seems to be a pre-Islamic taboo and re-defines the term not as a superstitious act, but as the fear of God: «it is not birr to go to houses from their backs but rather, pious is the one who fears God (wa-lākinna l-birra mani ttaqā).» The verse continues with an exhortation to enter houses by their doors (abwāb) and to fear God. Birr does refer also to ethical behav-¶ ior, however: «You do not attain birr until you spend (tunfiqū) from that which you love; and whatever you spend, God is aware of it» (q 3:92). More elaborately, at q 2:177birr is defined in one of the familiar «creeds» of the second and third sūras: «It is not birr that you turn your faces to the east and the west, but birr is one who has faith in God and the last day and the angels (see angel) and the book (q.v.) and the prophets (see prophets and prophethood), and [one who] gives wealth from love of him to kin and orphans (q.v.) and the unfortunate and ibn al-sabīl (probably those who have recently immigrated to Medina; see emigration) and to those who ask — and who frees slaves (see slaves and slavery) and undertakes worship and pays zakāt (see almsgiving), and who fulfill their compact (ʿahd), when they make compacts (see breaking trusts and contracts), and the steadfast (al- ṣābirīn) in adversity, in stress and time of tribulation (see trial); those who have integrity (ṣadaqū) — these are the ones who fear God (al- muttaqūn).»

Here, again, birr is contrasted with mere cultic practice, but is defined as faith and ethical behavior. It seems that toward the end of the period of revelation, a vocabulary defining virtuous membership in the community was in the process of development. Birr was among the terms that had significance in the pre-Islamic world but were being redefined to convey a new, qurʾānic ethical sense.

The common term khayrāt also refers to «good works» as in: «Vie with one another in good works» (q 2:148; see also 3:114 where it is linked with enjoining the maʿrūf; see below for a discussion of this term). The term usually is stereotyped with «vie in» or «hasten to» (e.g. q 23:56). Khayr itself means "good, " and in certain contexts has an explicitly moral sense, as in q 3:26: «In your hand (God) is the good (al-khayr).» ¶ Izutsu (Concepts, 217 f.) points out that this term usually refers to bounty and wealth, or to bounty and wealth properly used (but see also q 5:48; 8:70). Khayr, then, is a natural good, but beyond that, not much more can be said.

Likewise, it is difficult to translate ḥ-s-n and its derivatives more precisely than with the word «good.» Aside from aesthetic description and mere approval in a number of places, the root sometimes suggests ethical action: «Then we gave Moses (q.v.) the book complete for those who do good (alladhī aḥsana)…» (q 6:154). More often, it is overtly a reference to religiously-approved behavior, especially when this form is used in the plural, e.g. q 3:172: «Those who responded to God and the messenger after the wound befell them, for those among them who did well (aḥsanū) and feared God — a mighty reward!» Izutsu (Concepts, 224 f.) suggests that the root ḥ-s-n refers to pious acts and includes ethical acts informed by the pre-Islamic virtue of prudent forbearance (ḥilm). Of the first usage, a good example is the curious passage at the end of q 5:93: «For those who have faith and do good deeds (ṣāliḥāt), there shall be no transgression (junāḥ) concerning what they have eaten. Therefore — [be one of those who] fear God and have faith and do good deeds, then fear God and have faith, then fear God and do kindness (aḥsanū); God loves those who do kindness.»

The most obvious «ethics» usage of the root is with the form iḥsān, which occurs twelve times (q 2:83, 178, 229; 4:36, 62; 6:151; 9:100; 16:90; 17:23; 46:15; 55:60 [twice]), e.g. «kindly treatment of parents» (q 2:83, bi-l-wālidayni iḥsānan), or «Divorce twice, then take back with maʿrūf or release with iḥsān» (q 2:229). The point of these passages is to incite the listener to what he/she knows to be proper behavior.

Indeed, among the most common terms ¶ for virtuous acts, as a class, is maʿrūf, literally, «the known.» It appears thirty-two times in the Qurʾān, but is so taken for granted as a concept that even the commentators do not feel a need to explain it (see the discussions on the first occurrence of the term, q 2:178, in Ṭabarī, Tafsīr; Nīsābūrī, Tafsīr; Qurṭubī, Jāmiʿ). It is often paired with iḥsān and seems to mean nothing more specific than "good deed, " or «virtuous conduct.» It is worth noting that the implication of maʿrūf, as an ethical term, is that «the right thing» is known. One lexicographer suggests that the test of the maʿrūf is that «it is that in which the self finds ease (sakinat ilayhi l-nafs) and it deems it good, because of its goodness — intellectually, revelationally, and customarily» (Abū l-Baqāʾ, Kulliyāt, iv, 185). In other words, the Qurʾān assumes that some part of the good enjoined by the Qurʾān is known without revelational stipulation, perhaps being that which the Prophet’s audience knew to be the good from earlier (pre-Islamic) times (see Hodgson, Venture of Islam, i, 163). The scope of the term may be suggested by q 4:6: «[the guardian of orphans' wealth] who is poor: let him consume [of that wealth] what is appropriate (fa-l-yaʾkul bi-l-maʿrūf)» or q 9:71: «And the faithful men and women are protégés of each other, commanding the good (maʿrūf) and forbidding the reprehensible (munkar), undertaking ṣalāt and paying zakāt, and obeying God and his messenger…» The phrase «commanding the good and forbidding the reprehensible (al- amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar)» is one of the most common both in the Qurʾān and in later ethical and moral literature (for a recent discussion of this, see M. Cook, Commanding right and forbidding wrong). Here, the very word for «good» itself denotes a knowledge extrinsic to revelation.

None of these qurʾānic terms for virtue seems novel, though at least in the case of ¶ birr there is clear evidence of a term from pre-Islamic religious life being re-understood. For the most part, not only is the terminology of virtue familiar to the seventh century audience, but the very context of ethics is alluded to rather than specified. Although later Islamic ethical thought moved in the opposite direction (G. Hourani, Reason and tradition, 15-22; Reinhart, Before revelation, 62-76; 177-84), it is clear that the Qurʾān assumed its listeners knew the meaning of virtue, and could be assumed to recognize the virtuous course in a particular situation.

Vice

Vice, too is in large part assumed to be obvious in context. Perhaps it is here that the Qurʾān’s appeal to prudence (see below) is most important. Vice is not defined, but the consequences of vicious behavior are set forth at length in the threats of judgment (q.v.) and punishment so prominent in all parts of the Qurʾān.

A common word for vice is fasād, and other words from the root. The root occurs forty-eight times in the Qurʾān, thirty-five times in stereotype with fī l-arḍ, «on (the) earth.» Without the phrase «on (the) earth» it can mean «to ruin» (q 27:34), and in other places it refers to kufr, rejection of or turning away from God (e.g. q 3:63; 7:86; 16:88); in still other places fasād or mufsid is opposed to ṣāliḥ and so means «to do evil acts» (e.g. q 2:220). In the cases where it is linked to the phrase «on (the) earth» it invites us to see the corruption of an otherwise benign state. It is the acts of humankind that corrupt the earth (see corruption): «Had not God repelled some of humankind by others the earth would have been corrupted» (la-fasadati l-arḍu, q 2:251). The movement from literal ruin to metaphorical moral corruption can be seen in the glosses to the verse: «And when he (man) turns away he strives on ¶ the earth to corrupt it and to destroy tillage (al- ḥarth) and the generations (q.v.; al- nasl)» (q 2:205). The commentators harmonize these two terms and understand them first as "cropland and livestock, " but also as «women and children» (see Nīsābūrī, Tafsīr, ii, 98-200; Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, ii, 312-9). Humans can, then, by malice, corrupt an otherwise benign creation; and humans, like crops, can be ruined by the moral depravity of others. In the latter case, the need for moral intervention (by others) is clear: if the vicious are not "repelled, " they will corrupt others.

F-ḥ-sh is found twenty-four times in the Qurʾān and is defined as a transgression of the boundary (al- ḥadd; cf. Ṭabarī, Tafsīr, ii, 64). There is good reason to think, from its citation in verses referring to transgressions by wives (e.g. q 4:15, 25) and the so-called people of Lot (q.v.; q 27:54-5), that the term refers particularly to sexual transgression, of which «adultery» (zinā, see adultery and fornication) is one instance (q 17:32; see boundaries and precepts).

The root kh-b-th is found twenty-two times in the Qurʾān, fourteen of them in the form khabīth. Like f-ḥ-sh, it evokes the notion of disgust, as in q 21:74: «We delivered [Lot] from the village that was wont to practice wickednesses (al- khabāʾith). Truly they were an evil people, depraved (fāsiqīn).» The term khabīth is frequently offered as the antinomy for the ordinary word ṭayyib, «good.» These two are contrasted with each other and the attraction of the wicked is admitted: «Wickedness (al-khabīth) and good (al-ṭayyib) are not equivalent, though the plenitude of wickedness pleases you» (q 5:100).

F-s-q is also sometimes a term of moral disapproval, indicating depravity of some sort. The root appears in the Qurʾān fifty-four times. Its semantic field includes cultic transgressions, such as swearing by divin-¶ ing arrows (q 5:3; see foretelling; oaths and promises) and betraying covenants (q 3:81-2). For the most part, however, f-s-q is a term of theological opprobrium and Izutsu (Concepts, 157 f.) goes so far as to call it a species of kufr. Like other terms of ethical opprobrium, the term has little specific content — the Qurʾān’s audience is to recognize it when they see it.

The meaning of the root n-k-r in the fourth form is "to disapprove, " and so the passive participle munkar means «to be denied, be disavowed, disapproved of.» It is regularly paired with maʿrūf, as a slogan, however, and so its meaning must also be "the wrong thing to do, " "that which cannot be affirmed as right, " «that which is known to be wrong.» It occurs sixteen times in the Qurʾān, nearly always alongside maʿrūf, as in q 3:113-4, where the most virtuous of the People of the Book (q.v.) are described as reciting the signs of God and prostrating themselves, having faith in God and the last day, commanding the maʿrūf and forbidding the munkar, competing in the doing of good deeds (khayrāt): «…they are among the virtuous (al- ṣāliḥīn)» (q 3:114).

Ithm, junāḥ, dhanb, khaṭaʾ, and jurm are all terms for acts disapproved of, and each is frequently translated as «sin»; these five terms refer primarily to a violation of one of the legal or ritual norms instituted in Qurʾān. Although an illegality or ritual transgression is an ethical failure in the qurʾānic view, there does remain a sense in which these are formalistic failings that do not incite feelings of repulsion as do the other terms discussed above. Ithm, for instance, appears in q 2:85 referring to a covenant(mīthāq) violated (cf. q 2:84), and in q 6:120 in reference to failure to recite the name of God over food; in q 58:9 it refers to conspiring, after having been «forbidden conspiracy/confidential conversation» (nuhū ʿan al- najwā, q 53:8). Junāḥ is ¶ connected to circumambulating Ṣafā and Marwa during ḥajj or ʿumra (see pilgrimage) in q 2:158, while in q 4:24 the term refers to additional contractual stipulations in addition to the bride-portion. Dhanb is found in, for instance, q 26:14 where it refers to murder as grounds for punishment; and in q 81:9 the female infant asks what transgression of hers justifies her being killed (bi-ayyi dhanbin qutilat, see infanticide). Khaṭaʾ is equivalent to junāḥ, as in q 33:5, which is concerned with the technicalities of lineage determination: «There is no technical transgression in mistakes you make.» In q 4:92, khaṭaʾ refers to mistaken killing, while q 2:286 connects the word in its fourth verbal form to «forgetting.»

It is harder to assign a precise scope to jurm. In q 11:89 the term in its first verbal form refers to the failings of the people to whom the prophets Noah (q.v.), Hūd (q.v.), Ṣāliḥ (q.v.) and Lot were sent. q 10:17 suggests that a mujrim is someone who declares God and his revelations to be false, and the mujrimūn about to fall into the fire (q.v.) in q 18:53 seem to refer to those who associated gods with God (see q 18:52); q 25:31 states that the enemy who is appointed for every prophet comes «from the mujrimīn.» A mujrim seems, then, to be one of those damned for what are theological, rather than strictly ethical, transgressions.

The three words sayyiʾ/ sawʾ/ sūʾ (all from the same root: s-w-ʾ) correspond well to the semantic scope of the English word "evil, " both in its applicability to misfortunate acts, that is, natural evil, as in q 16:58-9: «If one of them is given news of [the birth of] a female, his face darkens and he is silently angry; he retreats from people as a result of the evil news given him (min sūʾi mā bushshira bihi)…,» and to morally reprehensible acts, i.e. theological or moral evil, as in q 6:136, a verse that speaks of the tribal custom of giving tithes to «partners» of God: «Evil is their rule (sāʾa mā yaḥku-¶ mūna).» It may be that the root suggests evil to be an intrinsic feature of the act, as in q 4:17-8 where «evil» deeds are done unwittingly: «…those who do evil in ignorance (yaʿmalūna l- sūʾa bi-jahālatin)…» Al-Nīsābūrī (Tafsīr, ii, 64) adds that sūʾ encompasses «all acts of disobedience, whether of the limbs or of the mind (qalb).»

Without doubt, words from the root ẓ-l-m are the most frequent terms for wrong-doing, appearing 310 times in the Qurʾān. The meaning of this term is complex and has engendered a relatively large body of discussion (e.g. Izutsu, Concepts, 164-77; Hourani, Injuring oneself; Husain, The meaning of zulm). In the broadest sense, the root means "wrong, " or "wrong-doing, " e.g. q 40:17: «[On the day of judgment] each soul is requited according to what it has earned. No wrongdoing (ẓulm) on the day! God is swift at reckoning (ḥisāb).» This last word, the commercial term "reckoning, calculating, accounting, " suggests that ẓulm is unearned harm — either in deed or in proportion. It is undeserved conduct vis-à-vis another that is denoted by ẓulm and its cognates.

The objects of ẓulm have occasioned much discussion. First, one human can do ẓulm to another by theft (cf. q 12:75), by consuming an orphan’s property (q 4:10), or by preventing the faithful from going to worship (cf. q 2:114). Second, one can wrong God: «Whoever transgresses God’s limits, they are the ẓālimūn» (q 2:229); also, «who does greater wrong than one who, reminded of the signs of his lord, turns away from them» (wa-man aẓlamu mimman dhukkira bi-āyāti rabbihi fa-aʿraḍa ʿanhā, q 18:57). There can be no question of «harming» God — as an orphan is harmed by having his property consumed — but rather of "doing wrong by him, " given the obligations that obtain in the relation between humankind and God (see above).

¶ The third and most controversial object of ẓulm is the self (ẓalama nafsahu). Thirty-six times the Qurʾān links the self/soul with ẓulm, e.g. q 7:23: «They (Adam and Eve) said: ‘Our lord! We have wronged ourselves (ẓalamnā anfusanā). If you do not forgive us and show us mercy we shall be among the lost!’» The faithless, whose fate is the fire (of hell), are also described as people who have "wronged themselves: " «The likeness of what they (the faithless) spend in this worldly life is to a frosty wind which strikes the crops of a people who wronged themselves, then destroyed it: God did not wrong them but they wrong themselves (wa-lākin anfusahum yaẓlimūn)» (q 3:117); «Then we gave the book as inheritance(awrathnā) to those whom we chose of our bondsmen — among them were those who wrong themselves (minhum ẓālimun li-nafsihi), among them were those who are tepid, and among them are those who race ahead in good deeds by God’s leave…» (q 35:32).

Hourani (Injuring oneself, 49-51) points out that the concept of "wronging oneself, " as a purely ethical concept, is problematic, especially from the point of view of the Aristotelian tradition that has dominated Western (and Islamic philosophical) ethical reflection. "Wronging, " that is, acting in a way that evokes the judgment that an act is morally unjust, requires the object of the action to be non-consenting, and unless one is a dualist, the agent (the «wronger») of acts done to the self necessarily consents in actions done by the agent. Therefore, one cannot be "morally unjust to, " i.e. "wrong, " the self. Hourani suggests that implicit in the root meaning of ẓ-l-m is the notion of harm, as well as wrong. Consequently, ẓālim li-nafsihi is "harming oneself, " inasmuch as a moral transgression has harmful consequences on the day of judgment. He concedes there may be in these qurʾānic passages some ¶ notion of the wrongdoer as having harmed himself because of some quality of the vicious acts done, although he thinks it likely that this is a later, philosophical reading into the qurʾānic text (Hourani, Injuring oneself, 56).

Acts, then, are categorized by the Qurʾān in terminology suggesting strongly that its message is to exhort Muslims to do the right act and eschew the wrong act, more than to define for them right and wrong. The same seems to be true of concepts for categorizing moral actors.

Classifying actors

Virtuous acts are signs of ṭāʿa, "obedience, " "submissiveness, " or "allegiance, " on the part of humankind (Lane, 1890-1; see q 3:100, where a Muslim obedient to People of the Book allies himself to their rejectionism, when the Muslim had previously been one of the faithful). One obeys God and his messenger and those given command: «And the faithful men and faithful women are protégés of each other, commanding the good (al- maʿrūf) and forbidding the reprehensible, undertaking ṣalāt and paying ẓakāt, and obeying God and his messenger — to these God will show mercy» (q 9:7; cf. 3:32; 4:59, 8:1). Obedience is a public, not a private virtue (q 24:53, q 47:21). Those who are obedient and loyal not only ally with each other as "protecting friends, " or protégés, as above, but ally themselves with God as well: «And the wrongdoers (ẓālimūn) have no protector (walī) nor ally. Or have they chosen protectors (awliyāʾ) other than him? But God [alone] is the walī» (q 42:8-9). The virtuous then are protégés or clients (see clients and clientage; protection) of God and «no fear comes to the protégés of God nor do they grieve» (q 10:62).

The opposite of the virtuous, the unrighteous, are those who «rebel against» (ʿ-ṣ-y) God. Adam’s transgression was that he ¶ rebelled against his lord (q 20:121), while Pharaoh (q.v.) also rebelled against the messenger that God sent (q 73:16). Rebellion is listed as a failing which the faithful avoid: «[O you who are faithful]… God has made you love faith and has made it beautiful to your hearts and made hateful to you ingratitude(kufr), wickedness (fusūq) and rebellion (ʿiṣyān). These are the rightly-guided!» (q 49:7).

The wicked are not just moral failures but active «enemies of God.» The notion of moral transgression as enmity gives a sharply affective edge to the notion of ethical failure. It is not, in qurʾānic discourse, that the vicious are merely misguided, but their moral failures make them active agents of corruption and opponents of God and his messenger: «…[The hypocrites] had faith, then rejected; their hearts are sealed up so they cannot understand… They are the enemy, so beware of them! May God fight them; what liars they are!» (q 63:3-4). The nature of this enmity is emphasized by the numerous places in which Satan, too, is described as an enemy — of mankind and of God. (e.g. q 7:22; 12:5; 35:6; 43:62). Enmity toward God is heartily reciprocated: «Who is an enemy of God and his angels and his messengers and Gabriel (q.v.) and Michael (q.v.), then God is an enemy to the ingrates (kāfirīn)» (q 2:98).

Despite this emotional characterization of ethical transgressors, the most prominent description of those who believe or act wrongly, is that they are «astray» (ḍ-l-l or gh-w-y): « Adam rebelled against his lord, and so went astray(ghawā)» (q 20:121); «…who rebels against God and his messenger has manifestly gone far astray(qad ḍalla ḍalālan mubīnan)» (q 33:36). The ethical implication of this terminology is that the errant can find, or be led to the correct path again. Repentance requires reform, however: «Who does evil out of ¶ ignorance(bi- jahālatin) then repents afterwards and does well (aṣlaḥa) [then God] is forgiving, merciful» (q 6:54). Such a view is completely consonant with the qurʾānic emphasis on God as merciful, compassionate, and forgiving, themes found on nearly every page of the Qurʾān. Forgiveness (q.v.) is a human virtue as well: «And those who avoid the greatest sins and indecencies and when angry, they forgive» (q 42:37; see also 42:40, 43).

Though there may be other terms with a scope that would place them under «ethics» (e.g. fājir, iʿtidāʾ, etc.), this sample suffices to show the shape and content of qurʾānic ethical valuation. Acts have moral values, and morally aware humans, as humans, recognize these values. The lie (q.v.) is bad, an act of kindness toward one’s parents is good. Acts are valued also because they affirm or deny theological truth or they signify obedience or disobedience to Islamic cultic norms. For the most part, however, the human capacity for moral knowledge suffices to provide judgment in particular cases. The details of moral conduct need not be specified. The qurʾānic contribution is less information that this act is good, that act bad, than it is the clarification of the stakes in choosing a particular ethical path. One may be God’s protégé or God’s enemy; a final judgment will recompense virtue and the oppressed and punish vice and the oppressors. The Qurʾān, in sum, does not so much inform as incite, it calls not so much for the correct assessment of acts, as for action.

Ethical knowledge and moral reasoning

From this discussion of ethical terminology, it should be obvious that the ethical epistemology of the Qurʾān differs from ethical epistemology as it developed within later Islamic theology and jurisprudence (see G. Hourani Islamic rationalism, passim; Reinhart, Before revelation, passim).

¶ As we saw above, the ability of humankind to perceive values, and the assumption of already-existing Arab cultural norms play a role in the knowledge of right and wrong. As Hourani noticed, (Ethical presuppositions) the Qurʾān takes for granted that thinking, or reflecting, will guide one to right action. (Even later commentators, who otherwise rejected this epistemological theory, recognized that the Qurʾān refers to knowledge that is common to all humans, e.g. Qurṭubī, Jāmiʿ, v, 185, commenting on q 4:36, says: «Scholars are utterly agreed that this āya is efficacious — nothing of it is abrogated. And it is [found] thus in all the scriptures. Even if this were not so, this would be known by means of the intellect, even if it were not revealed in scripture.»)

Though the noun ʿaql (glossed variously as « intellect, reason, mind») is never referred to, the Qurʾān uses verbal forms of ʿ-q-l for the activity of thinking, reflecting, ratiocinating, 49 times. There are places where it seems to mean something like "using common sense, " and others where it means, «reflect and draw the logical conclusions.» Both aspects of using the ʿaql are relevant for qurʾānic epistemology, as when the Qurʾān suggests that to read scripture requires one to draw the conclusion that righteous behavior is enjoined on scriptuaries as on others: «Do you command that people be good (birr) and you forget yourselves, while you yourselves recite scripture? Have you not reflected? (a-fa-lā taʿqilūn)» (q 2:44). It seems that the signs of God — which include but are not limited to scripture — must be reflected upon before action takes place; but when they are reflected upon one is led to moral truth: «Thus God makes clear his signs that perhaps you might reflect (laʿallakum taʿqilūna)» (q 2:242). The Qurʾān repeatedly lists features of nature (see natural world and the qurʾān) — e.g. that man has eyes¶ (q.v.), ears (q.v.), a heart; that God has metaphorically sown humans on the earth; that he has given life and death and distinguished night from day — and urges the hearer to draw the right conclusion: «Will you not reflect (a-fa-lā taʿqilūn)?» (cf. q 23:78-80). Ignoring the knowledge the intellect provides leads one to perdition: «[The people of hell] say, ‘Had we listened or reflected (naʿqilu) we would not have been among the dwellers in the flames’» (q 67:10). Likewise, ethical reflection can prevent one from being led astray and into moral transgression: «[ Satan] has led a large group of you astray; did you not reflect (a-fa-lam takūnū taʿqilūn)?» (q 36:62). It would seem that an argument based on proof (burhān) is decisive — again a reference to thought as a source of religio-ethical knowledge: «And we extract from every nation a witness and we say, ‘Bring your proof (burhān)!’ Then they will know the truth is with God and what they invented has led them astray» (q 28:75).

The same appears to be true for the root f-k-r, which is used 97 times. The root appears, as does ʿaql, in assertions that humans have been given the means to religio-moral knowledge if they reflect upon what they know: «They ask you about date-wine (khamr, see intoxicants) and games of chance (maysir, see gambling). Say: In both is great sin (ithm), and utility for humankind, though their sin is greater than their utility. They ask you also what to spend. Say: What is superfluous. Thus God clarifies to you the signs, perhaps you will consider (laʿallakum tatafakkarūn)» (q 2:219; cf. 2:242).

Despite the existence of epistemologically significant signs (q.v.), and the injunction to reflect upon them, there are still matters where the Qurʾān suggests that intuition and reflection are insufficient: the Qurʾān repeatedly says "prescribed (kataba or kutiba) for you/them is such and such, " ¶ followed by a rule or an adjuration (e.g. 2:187; q 2:216 for warfare). In many other cases, such a prescription is indicated by the simple imperative: «Give orphans their property» (q 4:2); or «Call to witness against [adulterous women] four of you» (q 4:15). The claim of God to make such prescriptions is rooted in several covenantal assumptions (see above), but the form of the command implies that this is a moral requirement whose justification is simple — it is God’s command. Implicit in the command form, however, is also the epistemological assertion that this norm is not definitively known except by revelation — hence we may read for kutiba ʿalaykum, «it is [scripturally] ordained for you» (q 2:216) and in the divine imperative «[God orders in this revelation that you] call to witness…» (q 4:15). The intellect is not a sufficient guide; it may also not be an altogether reliable guide; some acts clearly may seem intuitionally to be repulsive, while they are nonetheless enjoined upon the faithful: «Battle is ordained for you though it is hateful to you; it may happen that you hate a thing, but it is good for you, and it may happen that you love a thing and it is evil for you; God knows and you do not» (q 2:216). Because "God knows and you do not, " revelation remains an indispensable part of the qurʾānic moral epistemology. Nonetheless, most medieval Muslim scholars underestimated the role assigned to ethical reflection by the Qurʾān in Islamic moral knowledge (see G. Hourani, Reason and tradition; Reinhart, Before revelation).

Nature of the Qurʾān’s ethical stipulations

It is often suggested that the Qurʾān is full of rules, or, in more contemporary phraseology, that «the Qurʾān contains rules for every aspect of life.» In fact, even the most liberal counting produces only 500 verses (albeit, many of these are very ¶ long — sometimes, as much as ten or twenty times the length of the shorter verses) of the roughly 6220 in the Qurʾān that are «rules» (al-Mahdī li-Dīn Allāh, al-Baḥr, i, 238—308), and these include many āyāt with important legal implications. Yet these could hardly be called «rules» in the normal sense of the word: e.g. «He it is who created for you that which is on the earth» (q 2:29); or «Woe to those worshiping heedless of their worship who make show [of worship] but refuse to give aid» (q 107:4-7).

It is useful to recognize that the kinds of qurʾānic ethical stipulations can be sorted roughly into three classes, which we might call rules, principles, and admonitions to virtue.

Rules

«Rules» are decrees, which usually occur in the imperative. They are distinguished from principles and admonitions by the way in which their observance or neglect is assessed. Rules are either observed or not observed — the statement «Aḥmad observes the rule, ‘Forbidden to you is carrion and blood and the meat of swine (q 5:3)’,» is true if he avoids those things, and false if he does not avoid them. There are rules aplenty in the first several sections of the Qurʾān (i.e. those revealed in the later periods of revelation), and these stipulate diet (e.g. q 2:173), how to divorce (e.g. q 2:227-32; see marriage and divorce), cultic practice (q 3:57), etiquette (e.g. 24:27) contracting debt (2:282; see debts), as well as many other matters (see lawful and unlawful).

Principles

Yet to characterize the ethical content of the Qurʾān as «rules» would be a mistake. A good deal of the qurʾānic ethical advice and command is not in the form of rules, but what Dworkin calls "principles: " ¶ «Principles are standards to be observed… because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality…» (Is law a system of rules?, 43). «Principles are not applied, as rules are, in an ‘all or nothing’ fashion, but instead, a principle is something which [one] must take into account… as a consideration inclining in one direction or another» (ibid., 47). Principles have a dimension of «weight» or relative importance which one must take into account when two or more principles are in conflict — which, because of their generality, they often are (see prohibited degrees).

Principles may look to a qurʾānic reader like rules, but a consideration of some will show their difference. For instance, there is the maxim «The good deed (al- ḥasana) and the evil deed (al- sayyiʾa) are not equivalent; repel [harm] by what is better…» (q 41:34). This sort of Golden Rule, in its generality, can hardly be said to be observed or not observed in an ‘all or nothing fashion,’ as a rule is. To obey this injunction is not like avoiding swineflesh. One must judge that a given act in a given situation is better than other alternatives — all of which might also be good. The principle in q 41:34 might be seen to conflict, in some situations, with other principles, such as «Warfare [in the sacred month] is a major [transgression] but blocking [one] from the way of God and rejecting him and expelling people from the sacred mosque is greater with God; tribulation (al- fitna) is greater than killing» (q 2:217; see fighting). So, if one is blocked from the sacred mosque during the sacred month, does one "return evil with good, " or bear in mind that «tribulation is worse than warfare?» The Muslim must weigh these two principles, and make a decision based on how they are weighted. (This is not the same as resolving a conflict between two rules; both principles are invoked and in force.) There ¶ are many such principles — some obviously moral maxims, some less obviously so: «Do not be extravagant; God has no love for the extravagant» (q 6:141); or, «Those who are steadfast in desiring the countenance of their lord and undertake the worship (al- ṣalāt) and spend of what we bestowed upon them covertly and overtly and overcome evil with good: It is they whose aftermath will be the home (ʿuqbā l-dār, i.e. paradise)» (q 13:22). The Muslim is to weigh the value of spending versus the folly of extravagance, according to the situation. There is no rule in either of these texts, only principles. In fact, the majority of the Qurʾān’s injunctions are of this sort — guidelines rather than stipulations.

Some of these maxims, too, are orientational rather than prescriptive. The Qurʾān elaborates upon q 13:22 a few verses later: "God expands the provision of those whom he wishes, and contracts [it for those whom he wishes] while they rejoice in the life of the world — but what is the life of the world but [mere] pleasure compared to the afterlife? (q 13:26). This passage, too, shapes the ethical perspective of the attentive Muslim, but it is certainly not a rule or a call to a specific action. It is, rather, a principle, a moral fact which, to differing degrees, according to the situation, will inform his or her moral judgment.

Ethicists who describe ethical knowledge and reflection as grounded in rules have recently come under criticism. And the critics of such analysis would find support in the style of qurʾānic ethical discourse. Some of these critics assert the relative importance of moral reasoning over moral rules, and, though the distinction is sometimes artificial, it is clear that these qurʾānic principles have more to do with judicious judgment after reflection than with mere obedience or following prescriptions. The importance of the intellect (q.v.; ʿaql) and reflecting upon (fikr) likewise ¶ suggest that the Qurʾān is less about prescription than about guidelines and comparative judgment.

Admonitions to virtue

There is another critical perspective, however, that also finds support in qurʾānic ethics, and this is the claim that ethics is about the cultivation of virtues more than it is about rules or reasoning. For such ethicists, it is emulation rather than obedience or reflection that shapes most ethical endeavors. From this perspective, ethical questions are not decided by reflection of the sort «What ought I to do?» but, rather, «What would the sort of person I want to be do in this case?» The domain of this ethical method is virtue — how to be courageous, what is courage in a given situation, what is generosity, and so on.

The Qurʾān has many references to virtues and to specific vices. Goldziher has argued (ms [Eng. tr.], i, 18-44) and Izutsu concurs (Concepts, 45-119) that the Qurʾān redefines and sometimes denigrates the tribal virtues summed up in the term «manliness» (muruwwa), and moves the Muslim toward a new set of religious virtues. Izutsu suggests that, nonetheless, there is a religious re-appropriation of some of these tribal virtues by giving them «a consistent theoretical basis» (Concepts, 45). Here we can offer only a brief demonstration of qurʾānic virtues to show the importance of these themes in the Qurʾān’s ethical discourse (for more detailed discussions of some of these virtues, see virtues and vices; justice and injustice; trust and patience; piety).

Justice (ʿadl, literally, «equity» and qisṭ, «giving fair measure») is repeatedly enjoined throughout the Qurʾān. ʿAdl is used in quasi-legal contexts (cf. q 2:282; 4:58), but elsewhere seems to mean simply «being fair» or «fairness» (cf. q 4:3, 129; 16:76, 90). Almost as important as ʿadl is its near syn-¶ onym qisṭ. The root letters q-s-ṭ appear in various forms, and with various glosses, often linked to judging in judicial matters (e.g. q 2:282): sometimes as a mere synonym of ʿadl (e.g. q 49:9); more generally, as the virtue "equity: " «Oh you who believe! Be upright in equity (kūnū qawwāmīna bi-l-qisṭ), witnesses to God» (q 4:135; cf. 5:8). God likewise will act with qisṭ (q 21:47). As with the terms for «good» and «bad» discussed above, the exact scope of qisṭ is not spelled out in the Qurʾān; rather, the term appeals to the sense of virtue latent in its listeners, inculcated by moral education and moral exemplars — surely including the prophet Muḥammad.

Other virtues enjoined on Muslims include endurance (ṣabr) and integrity (ṣidq). Endurance (ṣ-b-r, in various forms) is among the most commonly cited virtues in the Qurʾān. It seems to mean something like the ability to maintain commitment despite difficult circumstances (q 2:177) and to persevere. One is to show fortitude, and do good deeds (ṣāliḥāt, q 11:11); to be persistent and rely upon [the] lord (q 16:42); to struggle and be steadfast (q 16:110): «Endure (ṣbirū), show fortitude toward others (ṣābirū), be steadfast (rābiṭū), fear God, that you might succeed» (q 3:200; cf. 68:48, «wait steadfastly for your lord’s decree [fa-ṣbir li-ḥukmi rabbika]»). Ṣabr is something prayed for (e.g. q 2:250; 7:126) and the term is frequently paired with ṣ-d-q.

Though the root ṣ-d-q is often translated as "telling the truth, " it is clear that the term means, rather, something like «integrity» or «being true to»; that is, it calls for a correspondence between reality and speech, behavior and public profession. It means fulfilling promises (ṣādiqīn, q 34:29), and therefore ṣidq can be something characteristic of God whose threats and promises are not empty (ṣadaqa llāhu, q 3:95; 33:22), and also of humankind who must act in accordance with their profes-¶ sions of faith (q 33:23). In addition to acting out one’s faith, the root also implies a public quality, a proclaiming of one’s allegiance — the root concept of ṣadīq, «friend» (q 26:101). The archetypes of this public integrity are prophets such as Abraham (q.v.) and Idrīs (q.v.), each of whom is an affirmer, a warner (q.v.; ṣiddīqan nabiyyan, q 19:41, 56). The concept underlying these words is simply the public performance of commitments made in private.

The vices contrary to these virtues would be pretension, boasting (see boast), and hypocrisy; all three are the objects of qurʾānic obloquy. For example, the Qurʾān condemns acting pretentiously, i.e. without integrity between conduct and true moral commitment, in «those who spend their wealth in the sight of men» (q 4:38), or, «Why do you say what you do not do? It is hateful to God that you say what you do not do» (q 61:2-3). Hypocrites (munāfiqūn) are condemned because «they say with their mouths what is not in their hearts» (q 3:167). The root n-f-q appears 34 times in this sense: «The hypocrites fool God; he fools them! If they rise to worship they stand up sluggishly to be seen (yurāʾūn) by the people nor do they mention God but a little» (q 4:142).

There are many virtues and vices commanded and condemned in the Qurʾān — Donaldson (Studies, 16 f.) lists humility (see modesty), honesty, giving to the poor (see poverty and the poor), kindness, and trustworthiness, and as vices he mentions boasting, blasphemy (q.v.), slander — and there are many more besides. Indeed, there are lists of virtues and vices at many points in the Qurʾān, for instance q 17:23-39, which Donaldson (Studies, 25) compares to the Decalogue (though there are 11 points — 4 virtues and 7 vices listed). q 25:63-72 is a series of injunctions to dignity and equipoise; q 31:13-19 enjoins theological commitment ¶ and modest reserve (cf. q 2:177; 4:36; for other discussions see Donaldson, Studies, 14-59; al-Shamma, Ethical system, passim).

Ethical sociology

In recent literature, ethics is discussed mostly as a series of problems that the individual faces as an individual. Universal ethics is assumed to require an interchangeability among persons, and it is only very recently that ethical «roles» have received the attention they require. In the Qurʾān, while the locus of moral responsibility is the individual, the nature of one’s moral responsibilities is in large part shaped by the group to which one belongs: some roles entail behaviors, some roles (on the part of others) provoke behaviors. There is also a sense in which the community as a whole is viewed as a moral agent (a perspective articulated in later legal thought as the concept of farḍ al-kifāya (J. Esposito (ed.), Oxford encyclopedia of the modern Islamic world, s.v. farḍ al-kifāyah). The constantly-repeated refrain ordaining that Muslims «command the good and forbid the reprehensible» (al- amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar) assumes one party exhorting another. So it is necessary here to discuss «ethical sociology» — the groups recognized by the Qurʾān as incurring or provoking distinctive moral attitudes and behaviors. The corporate bodies recognized in qurʾānic ethics and discussed below are: Muslims (and muʾmins, «believers»), scriptuaries (i.e. Peoples of the Book), hypocrites, and rejectors.

The Qurʾān acknowledges the existence of what might be called «ethnicity» — that is, tribal and ethnic identities (see tribes and clans), though it maintains that piety outweighs ethnic descent: «O people! We have created you male and female and have made you peoples (shuʿūb) and tribes (qabāʾil) that you might know one another. But the noblest with God is the most ¶ god-fearing (atqā) among you» (q 49:13). Yet though recognized, «tribe» seems to be a pejorative term since it is otherwise found to refer only to Satan’s minions (q 7:27). The other term for such social groups, ḥizb (pl. aḥzāb), is found more frequently, but it, too, suggests divisiveness (though there is a ḥizb Allāh, a «clan of God» [ q 5:56; 58:22], in opposition to the ḥizb shayṭān, the clan of Satan [ q 58:19]). None of these «political» categories has any ethical significance.

Muslims and non-Muslims

The Qurʾān uses the term nation (umma), which seems to be the people who fall under the jurisdiction of a particular prophet’s message (e.g. q 10:47) and who share a particular «historical epoch (ajal)» (q 7:34). Thus Christians and Jews form communities separate from Muslims. This distinction between nations is deliberate (q 11:118; cf. 5:48; 10:19; 16:93; 42:8), and consequently the relations of Muslims to each other differ from their relations to other "nations, " such as the Christians and the Jews (see christians and christianity; jews and judaism).

This «Islamic umma» (a phrase not attested in the Qurʾān; rather, "a nation submissive to you, " ummatan muslimatan laka, q 2:128) is envisioned as a community of virtue: «Who call to the good (al- khayr) command the good (al- maʿrūf), and forbid the reprehensible (al- munkar): These are the successful» (q 3:104). Muslims are urged to collaborate in virtue and not vice (cf. q 5:2), and they are in law a single entity (cf. q 5:48). Harmony among its members is enjoined: «Let not one group ridicule another group which might [in fact] be better than they (khayran minhum); nor women [ridicule] other women who might be better than they; neither defame yourselves nor apply derisive nicknames; bad is the name depraved (biʾsa l-ismu l-fusūqu) after ¶ faith» (q 49:11). Sūra 49 has the rules to construct the social solidarity of the Muslim umma. Some of the rules are rules of courtesy — lowered voices, not yelling at people who are indoors (q 49:2-5; see Qurṭubī, Jāmiʿ, xvi, 303-10). Others are rules of law to deal with disorder within the community: support the correct side but make peace between the groups in conflict (q 49:9). Suspicion (q.v.; ẓann), spying, and gossip (q.v.) are compared to eating the flesh of one’s dead brother (q 49:12). The faithful are given status as brethren (q 49:10; see brother and brotherhood). In this sūra, too, is the distinction (not of much account elsewhere) between the faithful (al- muʾminūn) who have faith without uncertainty and strive (jāhadū) with their property and themselves in the path of God (fī sabīli llāhi, see path or way), and are people of integrity (al- ṣādiqūn), as opposed to the Bedouin (q.v.), who, instead of saying, "We have faith (āmannā), " ought to say "We submit (aslamnā), " for the faith has not entered their hearts (cf. q 49:14-5).

The visible commitment to the Islamic summons and the willingness to sacrifice money, comfort and life to that end define the roles and responsibilities in qurʾānic social ethics. Those who have joined the Muslim community physically, and sacrificed their wealth, are protégés of each other (or the faithful in general; cf. q 9:71; 8:72). Those who have not joined the community are not entitled to the same support unless they actually seek it «in religion» (fī l- dīn); then Muslims are duty-bound to aid them — unless there be a treaty in force to the contrary (q 8:72).

Since the Muslims are a single group, relations with non-Muslims are shaped by that fact. Yet, in the end, the claims of ethical behavior outweigh those of communal solidarity. The distinction between Muslims and non-Muslim Peoples of the Book ¶ is fundamental to qurʾānic behavioral norms, but a common ethical monotheism of the members of these traditions seems to underlie more superficial distinctions. For example, q 3:84-5 lists in credal fashion the faith described as Muslim, in a way that is inclusive of more than just the umma of Muḥammad: «We have faith in God, in what has been sent down to us and what has been sent to Abraham, Ishmael (q.v.)… We do not distinguish any of them from the others. We are to him submitters. And who follows other than the submission (al- islām) as a religion (dīnan) — it will not be accepted from him; he will be, in the afterlife, a loser» (q 3:84-5). Consequently the Qurʾān recognizes the existence of virtue and even religious virtue among Peoples of the Book: «…Of the People of the Book, there is an established people reciting the signs of God at the time of night prostrating themselves. They have faith in God and the last day and they command the good and forbid the reprehensible and hasten to good deeds (al- khayrāt); these are among the righteous (al- ṣāliḥīn). And whatever good they do, they will not be rejected» (q 3:113-4). In other words, the Qurʾān assumes a moral universe shared with the other Peoples of the Book.

Christians and Jews, then, are not a demonized Other, the anti-thesis of Muslims, but they belong to the same religious genus. Yet, because of their theological errors, and, more importantly, due to their animus against Islam (cf. q 5:82 for the anti-Jewish and anti-«associator» polemic), the Muslims are enjoined not to take them as friends: «O you who are faithful! Do not take the Jews and Christians as friends. They are each other’s protégés (awliyāʾ). Who has taken one of them as a protégé — he is one of them. God does not guide a wrong-doing people» (q 5:51; the whole anti-People of the Book polemic can be found at q 5:41-82; see also q 3:118; ¶ 4:144; see polemic and polemical language). Furthermore, their theology leads them to moral error (q 5:62-3).

Indeed, it is the claim of the scriptuaries that moral norms do not apply to other than their own moral communities that brings God’s condemnation: «…And among [the People of the Book] are those who if you entrust them with a dīnār, do not return it to you unless you insist upon it; this is because they say ‘We have no duty toward the gentiles (al- ummiyyīn, see illiteracy).’ They say of God a falsehood, which they know» (q 3:75). Only a single verse enjoins struggle against People of the Book (this, contrary to Vajda in ei2, i, 264): «Fight those who do not believe in God nor the last day and do not forbid that which God and his messengers have forbidden and who are not religious with the religion of truth (lā yadīnūna dīna l-ḥaqqi) from among those given the scripture until they give a reward [for being spared] while they are ignominious» (q 9:29; for this translation, see Bravmann, Ancient Arab background). In sum, the boundaries of religious identity are irreducible in the qurʾānic understanding and crucially shape the ethical conduct of Muslims toward one another and towards others. A norm of moral conduct that transcends communal boundaries is, however, equally a part of the qurʾānic message.

Of social groups other than the People of the Book, two groups remain. One is the munāfiqs. Whatever the original meaning of this term, the usage of the Qurʾān conforms to the traditional definition of the term as «hypocrites» (for a survey of the term and its interpretation, see Brockett, al-Munāfiḳūn). Though munāfiqs may be analyzed as a separate group in various ways, for the present purpose they may be viewed as insincere Muslims. Sincerity and pretension are discussed in this article both above and below.

¶ The final social group that has ethical significance is the kāfir (ingrate, rejecter, unbeliever, pl. kuffār), who is equivalent to the mushrik (polytheist, syntheist, associationalist). Their theological errancy leads them also to commit morally aberrant acts and the qurʾānic instruction on their treatment is uncompromising — they are to be fought and subdued and compelled to acknowledge the single God and his messenger, save in the case of a compact (q 9:4-6). So central is the animus against the non-faithful that qurʾānic citations could fill this article, but a few of the clear ones follow: «Will you not fight a folk who broke their oaths and sought to expel the messenger — they began it with you first!… Fight them! God will chastise them with your hands and then will abase them and give you victory over them…» (q 9:13-4); «So do not obey the ingrates (al-kāfirīn) but struggle against them with a mighty struggle» (q 25:52; see also q 9:5); «So fight them until there is no disorder (fitna) and religion — all of it — is for God!» (q 8:39). As with Christians and Jews, Muslim women may not be given up to kuffār, but while the scriptuary women may marry Muslim men, kāfir women may not. Thus, Muslims are a group distinct from other — Wagner suggests that Islam creates a spiritual endogamy (La justice, 37).

Yet even with the kuffār, there are places where a more generous response is enjoined: «It may be that God ordains affection between you and those of them who act with enmity toward you… God has not forbidden you — with respect to those who did not war against you in religion nor drove you from your houses — that you be good to them (tabarrūhum) and equitable with them…» (q 60:7-8). It must also be said that identification with the kuffār is easily changed: «Yet if they cease, God sees what they do» (q 8:39), and «Say to those who reject that if they cease, it will be for-¶ given them…» (q 8:38), and even «If any of the polytheists seeks your protection, protect him that he might hear the word of God (kalāma llāhi), then convey him to his secure place; that is because they are a folk who do not know» (q 9:6).

Muslims

The Islamic community contains only two categories of persons: Muslims, and the Prophet (who is "dearer to the faithful than themselves, " q 33:6) and his family (see family of the prophet; people of the house). Muḥammad’s wives (see wives of the prophet), called «mothers of the faithful» (q 33:6) are not allowed to re-marry (q 33:53) and their punishment for immorality is double that of other women (q 33:30). The Prophet is permitted different marriage practices (q 33:50) and his acts are exemplary (q 33:21). His decisions are not subject to appeal (cf. q 33:36). Yet, he, too, is subject to rebuke for ethical failure (80:1-10; see impeccability) and his judgment in earthly affairs is subject to error (q 34:50). In all, his role as messenger is decisive and obedience to him is demanded as it is to God. To love the messenger is to love God (cf. q 3:31, lit. «if you love God, follow me [i.e. Muḥammad]») and both should be obeyed (q 3:32; 4:59; cf. 4:80). Otherwise, the Qurʾān levels the ranks of Muslims and makes them of the same status and responsibility.

This ethical corporatism holds within the Muslim community, as well. Islam creates a bond analogous to kinship, since the marriage rules make of Muslim women a group eligible for marriage only to Muslim men (Wagner, La justice, 37). In addition, the Qurʾān recognizes the natural bonds of family, and assigns moral duties to Muslims based on their roles within families. The reality of the claims made by familial affinity can be seen in the qurʾānic rejection of the pre-Islamic practice of permanent ¶ wife-repudiation by public declaration that the repudiated wife is as one’s mother, as well its rejection of the practice of the adoption of children by public declaration of kinship. It is "natural, " that is, «blood» ties that are affirmed: «God has not made for man two hearts in his breast, nor made your wives whom you repudiate (i.e. by saying that their backs are as your mothers' backs for you, tuẓāhirūna minhunna) your mothers, nor has he made those whom you claim [as sons], sons. That is just a saying of your mouths… Proclaim their real parentage. That will be more equitable in the sight of God…» (q 33:4-5).

It follows that taking care of the family is especially enjoined — parents, orphans who are wards, wives, familial relations (dhū l- qurbā), e.g. «They ask you what they shall spend. Say: You spend for good, then, on the two parents, and kin, and orphans and the unfortunate and wayfarers (ibn al-sabīl), and what you do of good, then God knows it» (q 2:215). Children are viewed, quite literally, as an asset (cf. q 17:64) and, like other assets, they can be an occasion of discord: «Your wealth and your children are disturbances» (fitna, q 8:28); but, unlike other forms of property or other disturbances, they may not be dispensed with, as tradition says had been the pre-Islamic custom among those who did not want to be burdened with a child. «Do not kill your children in fear of poverty; We shall provide for you. If you kill them, upon you is a great wrongdoing (khiṭān kabīran)» (q 17:31; cf. 6:151).

One is obliged to treat parents kindly, and to leave part of one’s wealth to parents and relatives (q 2:180; 4:36). Oddly, the obligation to show kindness to parents is stereotyped with injunctions to refrain from false faith and worship, e.g. «Say: Come, I will recite to you that which your lord has sanctified for you: That you not associate anything with him, and show kindness ¶ (iḥṣānan) to the two parents, do not kill your children from [fear of] poverty» (q 6:151; cf. 2:83; 17:23). It seems clear that parents were at some psychological level associated with polytheism and the old ways (see polytheism and atheism; south arabia, religion in pre-islamic); one is obliged to deal with them kindly despite their error (q.v.): «We have stipulated to humankind (al- insān) concerning his parents — his mother carried him, weakness on weakness, and his weaning is two years — thank me and your two parents. To me is the journeying. But if both make an effort to make you associate with me what is not known [to be true, mā laysa laka bihi ʿilmun], do not obey them but consort with them in the world kindly (maʿrūfan)…» (q 31:14-5).

Orphans are identified with other unfortunates (q 2:177; 89:17-8). Unlike many other ethical obligations, the concern with orphans dates from the earliest qurʾānic revelations, «you are not generous with orphans» (q 89:17), and continues into the later sūras (e.g. q 6:152). And, as with parents and other relations, one is enjoined to kindness towards them (q 2:83, 220).

Women, with men, are part of the fundamental order of creation (q 4:1). It has been understood — reasonably from a grammatical standpoint — that verses addressing the Muslims that use the grammatical masculine (yā ayyuhā lladhīna āmanū, and the like; see gender; grammar and the qurʾān) are addressed to women as well, unless there is contextual evidence to the contrary. So, women are included in all ethical stipulations addressed to Muslims. Moreover, men and women are described as each other’s protector (q 9:71) and in both the act of creation (q 42:11) and the promise of final intercession (q 47:19), women are explicitly included (see also q 33:35). On the other hand, women are seen as the source or object of backbiting, gossip, and other social discord, and they ¶ are warned against such behaviors (q 24:31; 33:59).

Relations between the sexes are grounded in the assumption that women are in a dependent relationship to men — as daughters, wards, wives, or slaves. Hence the designation of half shares in inheritance (q.v.) compared to their male counterparts (e.g. in q 4:11, though the verse may also be read as a requirement that shares be given them, since these are also called naṣīban mafrūḍan, «mandated shares» as in q 4:7; see also q 4:19). q 4:34 explicitly says: «Men are the custodians (qawwāmūn) of women by what (bimā) God favored some of them (masc.) over others (unmarked), and by what they spend of their (masc.) wealth. So virtuous women (al- ṣāliḥāt) are submissive (qānitāt), guarding for the hidden what God has guarded. Those from whom you fear uprising (nushūzahunna), exhort them, then banish them from the sleeping place (fī l- maḍājiʿi), then strike them. Then if they obey you, do not seek a way against them. God is sublime, great» (cf. 2:228; for further discussion, see Wadud, Qurʾān and woman, 74-78).

Wives are the objects of qurʾānic ethical concern — they must be dealt with kindly (q 65:2); must be given their marriage portion (q 4:4); must be given what remains of their property (q 4:20); even in divorce they must be treated kindly (q 33:49; 65:2); they must be protected in marriage and divorce so as to be supported (q 65:6); and the obligation of paternity must be acknowledged and enforced (q 2:233). Divorce is discouraged (q 4:35). Sexual relations between men and women married to each other are endorsed (q 2:223 says that women are «tillage» for men), and while lusting after men instead of women is condemned (q 27:55; 7:81; see homosexuality), the implication is that sexual desire between married men and women is legitimate.

The Qurʾān, then, recognizes that social ¶ roles determine many ethical obligations. Yet there remains also the notion that ethical obligations of fairness and justice transcend the boundaries of kinship or social group: "O you who are faithful! Be upright in justice (qisṭ), witnesses to God though it be against yourselves or the two parents or kin if he is rich or poor… (q 4:135; cf. 31:15).

Given this corporatism in qurʾānic ethical thought, it is not surprising that in later times some believed Muslims were assured salvation by being Muslim. This was, however, a mistake — at least from the Qurʾān’s perspective (see Madelung, Murdjiʾa). While roles and responsibilities are determined by membership in one group or another, ethical responsibility lies solely with individuals. It is individuals who are enjoined to act, and it is individuals who are promised requital according to how they have acted. In no place does the Qurʾān say Muslims will be in paradise, but those who are addressed by the Qurʾān’s words — surely including Muslims — are promised hell for their ethical transgressions.

Conclusion

Qurʾānic ethics fit neatly no single Western philosophical category; it is likely this is true for any lived — as opposed to academic — system. Yet the qurʾānic approach to what is called ethics can be clarified by judicious reference to Western philosophical ethics. For example, it has seemed obvious to scholars that the Qurʾān and the Islamic law derived from it represent a classic, almost a maximal, case of deontological ethics — that is, an ethical system in which behaviors said to be ordained are deemed right because of their nature, and one acts virtuously because that is what one ought to do, apart from outcomes (Gk. deon = duty). In addition, qurʾānic ethics might seem — especially ¶ in light of later developments in Islamic theology — clearly to be a classic case of what ethicists call «divine command theory» (Frankena, Ethics, 28-9). This might take the form of theological voluntarism in which something is good solely because God commanded it (see G. Hourani, Reason and tradition, 17); or it might be seen as naturalism in which God commands the good because its nature is «good» (as in Ralph Cudsworth, in Raphael, British moralists, i, 106-12).

There is certainly evidence to support these initial impressions: for many qurʾānic imperatives, there is no attempt to persuade, no explication of useful social consequences, no appeal to values already agreed upon. Yet, as pointed out above, there are, to the contrary, many instances where the imperative is presented with an appeal to follow reason or reflection. "Here are the signs, here is the evidence, " the Qurʾān proclaims; «now, acknowledge the claim that God has on you to act morally!» There is also a clear prudential argument for acting in accord with qurʾānic imperative, namely, the threat of punishment for transgression and the promise of eternal felicity for obedience to the command to act virtuously (though there is no argument that the good is defined by pleasant or desirable circumstances). Every virtuous act is promised a reward (q 99:7) and, so, every good deed has a telos apart from itself. Yet there is nothing to suggest causation — that the good is good because it leads to reward. Rather, the good coincides with reward but the affect of the text — the wrath, anger (q.v.), and repugnance at vice — suggests that the good and bad are so, independently of the strategic considerations of a utilitarian Muslim.

It is helpful, too, to ask, what is the qurʾānic ethical epistemology? Here again, the answer is complex. Later Ashʿarī and Ḥanbalī theoreticians asserted that the ¶ only means to moral knowledge was revelational declaration, or methodologically sound inference from such declarations. Yet there is no doubt that the Qurʾān appeals to many sources of knowledge (see knowledge and learning), and indeed that the qurʾānic stipulations are incomprehensible without appeal to other sources of knowledge.

First, it is undoubtedly the case that the Qurʾān assumes some moral facts to be known by human beings qua human beings. Second, there is some evidence that human beings can perceive moral truth when confronted with a particular situation. This latter feature conforms to what has been called "moral sense theory, " that is, the belief that some faculty analogous to sense or taste provides moral information when presented with a circumstance which calls for moral action. Like the English moralist Hutcheson, the Qurʾān seems to suggest that humans are disposed to feel approval or condemnation when they consider persons of good character, and their actions. Like Hutcheson (Raphael, British moralists, i, 302), also, the Qurʾān believes that humans innately feel gratitude, and a sense of obligation that ensues from that perception. How else can the near total absence of definitions for ethical terms be construed? What is the meaning of «well» in "treat your parents well (iḥsānan), " or «kindly» in «give your wife her marriage-portion kindly» (bi-l- maʿrūf, literally, «according to the known») — what do these terms mean, exactly?

There may be many answers, but since the Qurʾān did not spell out the details, it obviously expected its audience to draw upon their own knowledge, sense of fairness, justice, and gratitude to fill in these many undefined terms. As with all ethics, however (Frankena, Ethics, 7), qurʾānic morality is not mere convention — it is critical of convention, and it also demands ¶ a self-consciousness and self-examination that is the very stuff of ethical deliberation. So, the Qurʾān is not purely a kind of moral sense theory, nor is it averse to moral reasoning and deliberation.

In our consideration of the nature of qurʾānic moral stipulation, we saw that the Qurʾān has both rules (which are sometimes deontic, sometimes teleological), but also principles and admonitions. These weighted rules, and exhortations to virtuous conduct, are what ethicists call aretaic judgments. These take us beyond basic principles of ethical behavior and moral obligation and into more complex statements of value, and appreciation, and beyond obedience and conformity to estimation and value judgments (Frankena, Ethics, 61). Here we can place the concerns of social solidarity and of fellow-feeling that are also so much a part of qurʾānic moral language. The Qurʾān urges one to act with iḥsān, with maʿrūf, to choose khayr and ṭayyib, and suggests that hearts (by which the Qurʾān refers both to affect and consciousness; see heart) are drawn to the good and recoil from the bad.

The most important ethical feature of the Qurʾān is its recasting of moral conduct. As Brown has pointed out (Apocalypse of Islam, 80-1), the Qurʾān calls its audience to review the world, themselves, and their acts sub specie aeternitatis, to take a view that transcends the day-to-day perspective of petty utilitarianism and self-interest. Killing an infant daughter may make good economic sense in the quotidian, but, the Qurʾān says, viewed from a larger moral perspective, it is an abomination. To sacrifice property and lives for the qurʾānic kerygma may not be a good investment in worldly terms, but in meta-worldly terms it is a «can’t lose» proposition.

Yet, to repeat, this recasting of moral perspective rested upon a foundation of moral knowledge shared by the first/seventh cen-¶ tury Ḥijāzī Arabs who were its first audience. As Bravmann has shown with «al-jizya ʿan yadin» and in many more cases perhaps than we can recover, the Qurʾān appeals to, while redefining, contemporary moral norms. As Islam and the Qurʾān moved from this culturally coherent environment, through time and space, the shared foundation was lost and had gradually to be replaced — with local norms, with the codified Sunna (q.v.), and through reasoned inference of what was understood to be implicit in qurʾānic moral discourse. In some cases, this demonstrably took Islamic ethical reasoning in a direction different from its original orientation. Nonetheless, the Qurʾān has remained primary in theory, and crucial in moral practice for Muslims over the 1400 years of Islamic history.

A. Kevin Reinhart

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M. Cook, Commanding right and forbidding wrong in Islamic thought, Cambridge 2000

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M. Draz, Étude¶ comparée de la morale théorique du Koran suivie d’une classification de versets choisis formant le code complet de la morale pratique, Paris 1951

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J. Esposito (ed.), The Oxford encyclopedia of the modern Islamic world, 4 vols., New York 1995

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W. Frankena, Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1967, 19732 (rev. ed.)

Goldziher, ms, Eng. tr. C.R. Barber and S.M. Stern

E. Gräf, Zur Klassifizierung der menschliche Handlungen nach Ṭūsī dem Šaih̲ al-Ṭāʾifa (gest. 460), und seinen Lehrern, in W. Voigt (ed.), XIX Deutscher Orientalistentag 1975 in Freiburg im Breisgau, Weisbaden 1977, 388—422

M. Hodgson, The venture of Islam. Conscience and history in a world civilization, 3 vols., Chicago 1974

G. Hourani, Ethical presuppositions of the Qurʾan, in id., Reason and tradition in Islamic ethics, Cambridge 1985, 23-48 (originally published as Ethical presuppositions of the Qurʾān, in mw 70 (1980), 1-28)

id., ‘Injuring oneself’ in the Qurʾān, in the light of Aristotle, in id., Reason and tradition in Islamic ethics, Cambridge 1985, 49-56 (originally published as Ẓulm an-nafs in the Qurʾān, in the light of Aristotle, in G. Anawati and L. Gardet, Recherches d’islamologie. Recuil d’articles offert à Georges C. Anawati et Louis Gardet par leurs collègues et amis, Louvain 1978, 139-48)

id., Islamic rationalism. The ethics of ʿAbdaljabbār, Oxford 1971

id., Reason and tradition in Islamic ethics, Cambridge 1985

M. Husain, The meaning of ẓulm in the Qurʾān, tr. with comments by Kenneth Cragg, in Muslim world 49 (1959), 196—212

Izutsu, Concepts

W. Madelung, Murdjia, in ei2, vii, 605-7

H. Motzki, Walmuḥṣanātu mina n-nisāʾi illā mā malakat aimānukum (Koran 4:24) und die koranische Sexualethik, in Der Islam 63 (1986), 192—218

A. Nanji, Islamic ethics, in P. Singer (ed.), A companion to ethics, Oxford 1991, 106-18

A.-J. Paccard, Étude sur l’Islam primitif. La morale de l’Islam d’après le Coran, Thésis, Faculté libre de theologie protestante, Paris 1913

D. Rahbar, God of justice. A study in the ethical doctrine of the Qurʾān, Leiden 1960

F. Rahman, Law and ethics in Islam. Paper presented at the Ethics in Islam. Ninth Giorgio Levi Della Vida Conference 1983

D. Raphael (ed.), British moralists 1650—1800, Indianapolis 1991

A. Reinhart, Before revelation. The boundaries of Muslim moral thought, Albany 1995, chapter 6

J. Renard, Muslim ethics. Sources, interpretations and challenges, in mw 69 (1979), 163-77

S. al-Shamma, The ethical system underlying the Qurʾān. A study of certain negative and positive notions, Tübingen 1959

J.-C. Vadet, Les idées morales dans l’islam, Paris 1995

A. Wadud, Qurʾān and woman.¶ Rereading the sacred text from a woman’s perspective, New York 1992, 19992 (rev. ed.)

G. Wagner, La justice dans l’Ancien Testament et le Coran aux niveaux des marriages et des échanges de biens, Neuchâtel 1977

Cite this page

Reinhart, A. Kevin, «Ethics and the Qurʾān», in: Encyclopaedia of the Qurʾān, General Editor: Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Georgetown University, Washington DC. Consulted online on 07 January 2017 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1875-3922_q3_EQCOM_00056>

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